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AVIATION SAFETY AND SECURITY-LEGAL
DEVELOPMENTS
STEVEN A. MIRMINA*
T HIS ARTICLE BRIEFLY highlights recent developments in
aviation safety and security. The discussion is divided into
three topics. The first is protection from terrorist attacks. The
United States has been instrumental in developing new tech-
niques for detecting threats against airports, aircraft, and air
navigation facilities. The second topic is related to safety of the
aircraft in flight. There are both black markets and gray mar-
kets for bogus parts and materials sold as "spares" to airlines. A
corollary issue to the use of bogus parts is the use of decommis-
sioned military aircraft for civil purposes. With the end of the
Cold War, there are many military aircraft (which were never
designed for civilian purposes) currently available for sale. After
receiving appropriate authorizations, these aircraft may be used
for civil purposes. Many commentators are critical of this prac-
tice, while others, especially the military, support it. The third
aspect of safety and security addressed is the security of passen-
gers in flight. There are proposals for legislation to provide se-
curity to passengers by prohibiting alcohol, smoking, and
gambling in flight. The major concern is protecting passengers
from other passengers.
I. PROTECTION FROM TERRORISTS
The United States has led the world in developing techniques
to protect civil aviation from terrorist attacks. After the Lock-
erbie disaster in 1988, when Pan Am Flight 103 exploded, killing
270 people, experts later realized that a bomb was placed on the
* The author is an Associate in the aviation law practice group of Crowell &
Moring LLP, Washington, D.C. He is the author of several articles and the editor
of numerous books on international aviation law. This Article is a revision of a
speech presented at Leiden University in The Netherlands. The author wishes to
express his thanks to Mr. George Georgallis for his assistance in securing some of
the materials necessary for preparation of this Article.
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airplane in a suitcase in Frankfurt. The terrorist who checked
the suitcase never boarded the plane. As a result, airlines have
now instituted very strict programs of "bag-matching." If the
passenger does not board the aircraft on which his baggage is
loaded, the luggage is removed (and possibly destroyed).
Since 1988, the threat of terrorism against civil aviation has
increased. Until the early 1990s, the greatest threats against avi-
ation were overseas, rather than in the United States.' However,
the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City and
the Federal Building in Oklahoma City have demonstrated that
domestic terrorism is greater than ever before.2 This was fur-
ther illustrated by the bombing of Philippine Airlines Flight 434
in December 1994. Through accidentally uncovered informa-
tion, it was learned that this bombing was the first of several
planned attacks on future American flights traveling through
Asia.'
Among the many methods of combatting terrorism, three of
the approaches are:
* the development of existing technology to detect explosives
in cargo, checked baggage, and carry-on bags;
" a procedure called "Automated Passenger Profiling;" and
* the installation of anti-missile defense systems in civil
aircraft.
On July 17, 1996, TWA Flight 800 exploded over Long Island
Sound in New York, killing 230 people. The investigators may
never know the cause, but some reports suggested that it may
have been a bomb placed in the plane or a surface-to-air missile
launched from the ground.4 As a result of this tragedy, Presi-
dent Clinton directed Vice-President Gore to establish a com-
I See Aviation Security: Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed, Testimony Before the Sub-
committee on Aviation, COMM. ON TRANSP. AND INFRASTRUCTURE, H.R., GAO/T-
RCED/NSIAD-96-251, at 2 (statement of Keith 0. Fultz, Assistant Comptroller
General) [hereinafter Fultz].
2 See id.
3 See id. at 3. Rarnzi Yousef, who was recently sentenced to 240 years in solitary
confinement for his role in the World Trade Center bombing, was also sentenced
to life in prison for his role in the Phillipine Airlines attack. See Gary Fields,
Yousef Sentenced to 240 Years in Solitary, USA TODAY, Jan. 9, 1998, at 4A.
4 See generally At Outset, Terrorist Act Against TWA Flight 800 Seems Likely, AIR
SArFTY WK., July 22, 1996, at 8; "Evidence" of Missie Shooldown in TWA 800 Generates
New Speculation in Cause of the Tragedy, AiR SAFElY WK., Mar. 17, 1997, at 8.
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mission and report forty-five days later on how to deploy the
latest technology to detect the most sophisticated explosives.5
Previously, fundamental security measures consisted of walk-
through metal detectors for screening passengers, and the use
of X-ray devices to examine baggage. These programs were
widely used in the last two decades out of concern for hijacking,
more than out of concern for devices that may destroy the air-
craft. However, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is
now concerned about passengers smuggling bombs aboard,
either in their carry-on bags or on their own bodies. As men-
tioned earlier, the American government uncovered a plan by
terrorists to systematically bomb twelve U.S. airliners out of the
sky over the Pacific Ocean, and in the last eight years, 700 peo-
ple have died when bombs destroyed the aircraft on which they
were flying.'
One of the Gore Commission's proposals was increasing the
use of bomb-detection devices.7 Unfortunately, there is not yet
one machine that can detect all possible explosive devices in
checked baggage, carry-on bags, and on passengers. Thus, for
each type of baggage, there are different machines.
A. HIGH TECH METHODS FOR IMPROVING AVIATION SECURITY
1. Checked Baggage
For checked bags, the latest device is called the CTX-5000. It is
a fascinating machine in the sense that it is a computerized to-
mography device based on advances made in the medical field.
Tomography, simply stated, is the process of examining a sub-
stance layer by layer to determine its qualities. It is very thor-
ough, but rather slow in processing bags. There are also
advanced X-ray devices that process bags more quickly but have
lower detection capabilities. Another device uses electromag-
netic radiation, searching for particular elements that are often
used in manufacturing explosives, but as one can imagine, there
will always be new explosives created that can defeat the detec-
tion system.8
5 See Exec. Order No. 13,015, 3 C.F.R. § 213 (1997), available in 1996 WL
480821.
6 See Initial Report to President Clinton at I (White House Comm. on Aviation
Safety and Sec., Sept. 9, 1996).
7 See Final Report to President Clinton at 21 (White House Comm. on Aviation
Safety and Sec., Feb. 12, 1997) [hereinafter Final Report].
8 These three machines are discussed more fully in Fultz's testimony. See Fultz,
supra note 1, at 7.
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2. Carry-On Baggage
For carry-on items, there are different systems altogether. The
devices that thoroughly screen carry-on bags and electronics
cannot detect bottles or other containers that contain liquid ex-
plosives. It is hoped that commercially available technology will
be able to detect liquid explosives in a few years. There are sev-
eral manufacturers who successfully sell machines that can de-
tect the residue or vapor that explosives leave on the exterior of
carry-on bags. These machines are sometimes called "trace de-
tectors" or "sniffers." They are very accurate and are not overly
expensive. 9
3. Passengers
For passengers, other trace devices may be used. Some of these
trace devices detect vapors or residues that may be left on pas-
sengers' hands or clothes, or in the air that surrounds their bod-
ies. Other devices scan a passenger's body for concealed
weapons or items under clothing."0 However, some passengers
may find these machines intrusive. In a press conference on
September 9, 1996, President Clinton was asked the following
question: "Mr. President, the high[ly] sophisticated technology
that you mentioned this morning for screening passengers for
bomb detection technology can see through clothes. Do you
expect there to be a major debate over privacy issues and civil
rights in connection with the deployment of this technology?"'1
The President intelligently turned to the Vice President and
asked him to comment on the issue.' 2
B. Low-TECH METHODS OF IMPROVING AVIATION SECURITY
1. Bomb-Sniffing Dogs
In addition to high-technology methods, other methods exist
for improving aviation security. One such method is the use of
bomb-sniffing dogs. Canines, famous for their keen sense of
smell, are being used more and more to detect explosives and
drugs. The Gore Commission on Aviation Security suggested
t. See id. at 8.
1o See id. at 9.
'I Remarks by the President During the White House Commission on Aviation
Safety Announcement, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1685 (Sept. 9, 1996). The
civil rights implications of using these machines are outside the scope of the pres-
ent analysis.
12 See Fultz, supra note 1, at 3.
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expanding the number of well-trained dogs and handlers to sig-
nificantly and rapidly improve security.1 3
Additional methods of ensuring the safety of aviation include
controls over who works in secure areas around the aircraft and
who boards the aircraft.
2. Screening Airline Personnel
There are proposals to require investigations of criminal back-
grounds and FBI fingerprint checks for all people who screen
luggage for bombs and all airport and airline employees who
have access to secure areas. Currently, there is no such
mandatory background examination for employees who have
unrestricted and unescorted access to secure areas of airports. 4
Considering the potential to introduce explosive materials into
these areas, the Gore Commission recommended that criminal
checks (possibly with the cooperation of Interpol) and finger-
printing systems be implemented. 15
3. Automated Passenger Profiling
Passenger profiling is a low-cost idea using data already avail-
able in computer databases. These data would be used to ex-
amine passengers boarding the aircraft to determine if any
might be a higher risk to civil aviation than others. Many agen-
cies, such as the U.S. Customs Service, use similar systems. By
using these data, already publicly available through court or
criminal records, security officers are better able to focus their
attention and resources. The Gore Commission proposed that
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
(ATF) pool their data concerning known terrorists, terrorist
groups, hijackers, and bombers to develop profiles of "high-risk
passengers."" However, the proposals are not free from
problems. If, for example, a passenger's flying habits were used
as a criterion, many business-people or government personnel
who travel to places such as Syria, Libya, or Cuba, may be
stopped or subject to more thorough questioning.
The passenger profiling system is not without criticism. The
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) is concerned that these
13 See Final Report, supra note 7, at 23.
14 See id.
15 See id. at 20-21.
16 See id. at 4-5.
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databases would eventually include personal and unnecessary
data, such as fingerprints, DNA samples, and bill-paying
records.'" Other critics suggest that it pits privacy against safety
by allowing access to data such as marital status and travel hab-
its. Conversely, supporters of the system have responded that it
also profiles passengers who are "low-risk" such as a family travel-
ing to Disneyland for their summer vacation. These passengers
would face little more than the normal security checks. The
government would not stop passengers merely because of their
race or ethnicity; African Americans, muslims or other minori-
ties will not be examined more closely than white passengers,
especially considering the existence of various Caucasian terror-
ist groups such as the IRA (from Ireland) or ETA (from the
Basque country in Spain and France). Privacy issues should not
be used to thwart the aims of increased aviation security; simul-
taneously, the aim of aviation security must not be used to vio-
late personal privacy."8 Some middle ground must be found to
resolve the competing viewpoints.
C. INSTALLING ANTI-MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN CIVIL
AIRCRAFT AND ANTI-TERRORIST TRAINING
It is now doubted that the explosion of TWA Flight 800 was
caused by a surface-to-air missile, but several eyewitnesses stated
that they saw a ball of fire shooting from the ground upwards to
the plane, before the plane exploded. This may or may not be
true."' However, the U.S. Department of Defense is evaluating
this possibility in conjunction with other government
investigators.
The United States is combatting the threat of terrorist acts
against U.S. carriers. Vice President Gore stated that "when ter-
rorists attack an American airliner, they are attacking the United
States."'2" To this end, the Gore Commission stated that it is also
important to provide anti-terrorism assistance in the form of air-
port security training to countries with airports served by airlines
17 See Graeme Browning, Big Brother May Get His Big Chance, NAT'LJ., Sept. 21,
1996, at 2037.
18 See Justice )epartment Says Proposed Passenger Profiling System Non-Discriminatory,
AIR SAFETY WK., Oct. 20, 1997, at 6.
9 See At Outset, supra note 4, at 8; 7WA 800 Inquiry Seeks More Detail on "Streaks of
Light," AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 25, 1996, at 32; "Evidence" of Missile
Shootdown, supra note 4, at 6-8.
'.0 Fuiltz, sup/ra note 1, at 1.
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flying to the United States. 21 By training foreign countries to
detect explosives, protect VIPs, and deal with hostage situations
and other emergencies, international civil aviation is safer for all
concerned. The proposed 1997 budget for this program was $2
million, reflecting the U.S. commitment to assist other countries
through training security personnel.2
II. AIRCRAFT SAFETY
This section of the Article will address the safety of the aircraft
while it is still on the ground in the hangar. It addresses the
risks associated with (1) bogus parts and bogus aircraft, and (2)
former military aircraft used for civilian purposes.
A. "BoGus AIRCRAFT" OR "BOGUS PARTS"
A bogus or "counterfeit" aircraft is an aircraft about which the
owner or seller thereof intends to cause confusion or to deceive
the buyer as to the authenticity of the product.2 A seller of
counterfeit aircraft or parts uses trademarks, falsified papers, or
other documentation to give the impression that the product is
manufactured by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM).
A counterfeit plane may be constructed from surplus military
aircraft, parts salvaged from accidents, or other parts that are
not authentic to the original craft. This serious problem causes
not only death and bodily injury but also property damage and
increased insurance costs.
Advertisements in the aviation press offer money for aircraft
or parts involved in accidents, fires, or wrecks. There are stories
of helicopters destroyed by fire that years later are "remanufac-
tured" and sold again.24 The concern for safety is obvious. Pas-
sengers and purchasers of aircraft rely on brand names (as in
any other industry) for guarantees of quality and workmanship.
Aircraft or helicopters that are remanufactured by parties
other than the OEM or without the OEM's approval may not
conform to the standards of quality and safety used in its pro-
duction. OMEs are concerned that they will face increased
products liability litigation. Moreover, they may face negative
publicity and damage to their business reputation, in addition to
21 See id.
22 See id.
23 James L. Burt, III, Bogus Aircraft Offenses and Defenses, 61 J. AIR. L. & CoM.
859, 859-60 (1996).
24 See id. at 861-62.
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competing against their own business products in the reduced
market for their goods.
The black market (or gray market) for these goods is con-
stantly growing. These bogus parts are known as "suspected un-
approved parts" (SUPs), and the use of these unairworthy parts
is not a small problem. An audit of aircraft repair stations in the
United States and in foreign countries revealed that as many as
ninety-five percent of the parts inventory of parts distributors
and brokers were unapproved.2 ' Not all of these parts are actu-
ally dangerous, but they do not have the "parts manufacturer
approval" (PMA).
The FAA is making efforts to combat SUPS by regulating parts
distributors and imposing sanctions against distributors of unap-
proved parts. Quality assurance is being furthered by the use of
Notices, Orders and Advisory Circulars. However, the FAA pro-
cess of certifying parts distributors is not to protect the proprie-
tary rights of manufacturers. Rather, the concern is safety. In
doing its investigations, the information the FAA gathers is kept
confidential. Thus, if a manufacturer is aware of competitors
who are making identical but unapproved parts (likely violating
intellectual property laws), the FAA will not reveal the identity
of infringers of the intellectual property rights.26 In Europe, the
Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) have regulations similar to
those of the FAA creating an approval process for parts
manufacturers.
Manufacturers of bogus aircraft parts face both criminal and
civil penalties. The Federal Register states that "the only person
authorized to rebuild an aircraft is a person who manufactured
it under a type or production certificate. 27 Persons guilty of
such actions can suffer up to three years imprisonment and civil
2-. See Kenneth P. Quinn, Note, Bogus Issues and Unapproved Parts: Sorting out the
Competing Tensions, 9 AIR & SPACE LAw. 11 (1995).
26 See United Tech. Corp. v. FAA, Civil Action No. 3:93CV01223 (FTGD June
18, 1993). UTC sued the FAA under the Freedom of Information Act, arguing
that the identity of the manufacturers of the unapproved parts was public infor-
mation that it had a right to know. The FAA responded that it would not release
the design drawings of the parts manufacturers because by disclosing this infor-
mation, future applicants for approval would hesitate to submit information.
27 14 C.F.R. § 43.3 (1996). There are also other Federal Aviation Regulations
that determine who may repair or rebuild an aircraft and laws forbidding remov-
ing or adding data plates that are not authorized by the FAA. See generally 14
C.F.R. § 43 (1996).
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penalties up to $1,000 for every violation, and up to $10,000 for
giving false information to the FAA.2"
If the accused manufacturer falsely represents that this rebuilt
aircraft was made by the original manufacturer, he may be fined
or imprisoned for up to five years. 9 In addition, there are other
crimes for which he might be found guilty, such as endangering
the safety of aircraft in flight, fraud, and conspiracy against the
United States. °
B. FORMER MILITARY AIRCRAFT USED FOR CIVILIAN PURPOSES
The problem of using former military aircraft for civilian pur-
poses is related to bogus parts and has more or less developed
within the last ten years. At the end of the Cold War, the Berlin
Wall came down, and United States and Soviet relations
warmed, causing a reduction in the demand for military aircraft
previously necessary.
This issue has competing policy objectives. On the one hand,
the U.S. Department of Defense (the Pentagon) has thousands
of surplus military aircraft that are no longer necessary, but still
have substantial residual value and can be reutilized (and sold),
benefitting both the government and the purchaser. On the
other hand, the influx of so many aircraft into the market might
financially destroy the market. Additionally, manufacturers are
concerned that used aircraft, have a limited life and question
their safety. The aircraft may have irreparable defects and possi-
bly incomplete maintenance records. Most importantly, some
of these aircraft have not been shown to meet the requirements
of the ICAO Annexes, particularly Annex 8 to the Chicago
Convention. 1
What happens to the surplus military aircraft?3 2 The Penta-
gon disposes of surplus aircraft in several ways:
28 Title IX of the FAA Act provides for criminal sanctions for acts inimical to
aviation safety.
29 See Burt, supra note 23, at 866 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994)) for further
details and discussion.
30 See Unapproved Parts and Aviation Safety: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
Gov't Affairs, Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov't Mgmt., 105th Cong. (1995) (statement
of A. Mary Schiavo, Inspector General, U.S. Dept. of Transp.) (analyzing the
problems associated with bogus parts, SUPs, and the related U.S. regulations).
31 International Air Services Transit Agreement, Dec. 7, 1944, 59 Stat. 1693,
EAS 487, 3 Bevans 916, 84 U.N.T.S. 389.
32 This discussion focuses on the United States, but there are also many similar
programs throughout Europe and N.A.T.O.
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" some are retained for extra parts and for training;
* some are given to federal and state drug law enforcement
agencies for participation in the National Drug Enforce-
ment Program; for example, the aircraft are used to fight
drug traffickers in the Caribbean and Central America;
" some are sold, or given away, as Excess Defense Articles
(EDA) through the security assistance Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) programs;
* some are given to military history museums or exhibits; and
* some aircraft go to the Defense Reutilization and Market-
ing Office for disposal, which includes sale, because many
aircraft "carcasses" are complete and functional.
When these aircraft enter the civilian market they are certifi-
cated in either a standard or a restricted category.
Standard Category Aircraft are shown to comply with the Fed-
eral Aviation Regulations (FARs) and have no unsafe condi-
tions.3 Surplus Military Restricted Category Aircraft have been
manufactured under the specifications of the U.S. armed forces.
There are several reasons for a separate category for military
aircraft. The military often designs aircraft for a particular mis-
sion, and it is uncertain whether the same standards for civil
aviation are maintained by the military. Furthermore, it is prob-
able that the FAA will not know the exact military service history
of any aircraft. For example, military helicopters would need to
go through extensive modification before they would be certi-
fied by the FAA for use by private operators, such as air ambu-
lances or air taxis; however, military aircraft may be more readily
used for operations such as firefighting or law enforcement. For
this reason, they are in the Restricted Category.
Standard Category Aircraft are reviewed and tested with the
quality overseen by the FAA before the aircraft can receive an
airworthiness certificate.
Restricted Category Aircraft are reviewed through military
records, service records and visual inspection to indicate that
the aircraft has no patent unsafe conditions. Such aircraft may
not be exported from the United States without the permission
of the importing country because the aircraft have not been
shown to meet certain minimum standards.
33 See Ken Reilly, Surplus Aircraft Symposium, Surplus Government Aircraft, A]
Michaels, Suspected Unapproved Parts Programs and Airworthiness Rotorcraft Specialist,
Fort Myer Officer's Open Mess, Koran Room, Arlington, VA (1994) (discussing
the standard and restricted categories).
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Not many people object to the special purposes for which
these aircraft are used. For example, they are used for fire-fight-
ing purposes or agricultural purposes, such as crop-dusting.
However, when they are no longer utilized for their intended
purposes and are instead used for carrying cargo or passengers
for compensation, air carriers object. These aircraft were not
designed for long-life service in civil aviation, but rather for oc-
casional service and possible expendability in times of war. Be-
cause of these safety uncertainties, such aircraft are prohibited
from carrying persons or property for hire or from operating
over densely populated areas or near busy airports.
In practice, these aircraft are operated to earn revenue in air
transportation. Often, the owners of the aircraft dry-lease the
aircraft and later provide crews and maintenance through a dif-
ferent corporation. Since the U.S. government loses control
and oversight over these aircraft, they are now beginning to
compete with normal certificated civil aircraft.
The FAA has measures to prevent former military aircraft
from being used in commercial civil aviation. Every aircraft reg-
istered in the United States must have an airworthiness certifi-
cate displayed during flight. To receive this certificate from the
FAA, the aircraft's design must be approved and "type certifi-
cated" by the FAA. In other words, if a surplus aircraft is ap-
proved only for scrap material, then the aircraft would not pass
inspection, would not receive an airworthiness certificate, and
thus would not be permitted for commercial use.
When a U.S. registered aircraft is sold, both the owner and
the buyer must notify the FAA of the sale. The FAA then issues
the new owner what is known as an "N-number," which is linked
to the aircraft's serial number. The FAA can trace aircraft sold
illegally back to the original owner by using this N-number.
III. PROTECTION FROM FELLOW PASSENGERS
The third and most entertaining part of this Article examines
safety from dangers presented by other passengers in the air-
craft. In the 1970s and 1980s, safety from other passengers gen-
erally referred to safety from hijacking. International
conventions were drafted to address this issue.3 ' Now, however,
34 See, e.g., Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,
Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1643, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 (entry into force Oct. 14, 1971,
with 140 ratifications in 1994; established the crime of hijacking and required the
state that held the offender to prosecute or extradite him (generally, aut dedere,
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safety from other passengers in flight refers to safety from ob-
noxious passengers, including passengers who obviously had too
many glasses of champagne, who unsuccessfully invited the
flight attendant to dinner, or who just lost $1,000 through the
in-flight gambling or entertainment system.
There are many federal laws that protect the safety of civil
aviation, and those that protect the passengers in flight can be
broken down into three categories. There are laws against:
* smoking in aircraft and
* gambling in aircraft.
There is no law against drinking alcohol in aircraft, but Part
III. C of this Article contains descriptions of actual cases, which,
after reading, the reader may conclude that there should be
laws prohibiting excessive drinking in aircraft.
A. SMOKING IN AIRCRAFT
There is no U.S. law that bans smoking on international
flights to and from the United States. If there was, the law
would jeopardize aviation agreements to which the United
States is a party. A non-smoking law on domestic flights, how-
ever, comports perfectly with international law. 5 However, on
an international route, any aircraft that is outside the territorial
jurisdiction of a state may only be regulated by the state that
owns or operates it.36
In 1973, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) adopted a rule
requiring U.S. airlines to provide separate sections for smokers
and non-smokers on both domestic and international routes.17
The main reason for this rule was comfort rather than safety or
health. In 1984, the rule was amended so that any passenger
who arrived by the check-in deadline that wanted, would be pro-
aut punire)); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety
of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 567, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 (entered into
force on Jan. 26, 1973, with 150 ratifications; internationally prohibited attacks
and interference with air navigation facilities on domestic flights); Convention
on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, Mar. 1, 1991,
30 I.L.M. 726 (not yet entered into force; drafted as a result of the destruction of
Pan Am flight 103 by a plastic explosive hidden in a radio cassette player).
35 See Donna Abu-Nasr, Caution Advised Before Banning Smoking on International
Flights, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 16, 1996, available in 1996 WL 4431690 (referring
to testimony of William Karas, an attorney with the International Airline Coali-
tion on the rule of law).
36 See id.
-7 See 14 C.F.R. § 252.7 (1997).
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vided a seat in the non-smoking section. 8 If no non-smoking
seats were left, then the airline had to expand the non-smoking
section to accommodate the passenger.39 Additionally, smoking
was completely banned on aircraft with fewer than thirty seats,4"
and no cigar or pipe smoking was allowed on any aircraft.41 In
1988, smoking was banned on all domestic flights of less than
two hours, and in 1989, was extended to all flights shorter than
six hours.42
In 1992, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
passed a non-binding resolution encouraging Member States to
progressively ban smoking on all international passenger flights.
As it was non-binding, it has not been effectuated.
In 1994, the House of Representatives passed a bill intended
to ban smoking on all domestic flights and all international
flights arriving to or departing from the United States. 44 Be-
cause the Senate never acted on this bill, it never became a law.
If it would have, it would have violated some basic provisions of
international air law.45
Smoking should be banned for several reasons other than
flight safety. First, passengers on international flights "fall
asleep with lit cigarettes, burn flight attendants as they walk
down the aisles and frequently extinguish cigarettes on the
floor. ' 46 Some flight attendants working on those flights suffer
nausea, dizziness, severe headaches, fatigue, and loss of bal-
ance.47 And sometimes fights occur between smoking and non-
smoking passengers.
There are legitimate safety reasons for banning smoking on
flights. In 1983, one passenger on an Air Canada DC-9 sneaked
into the lavatory to smoke a cigarette. A fire started and twenty-
38 See id.
39 See id.
40 See id. § 252.13.
41 See id. § 252.15.
42 See 49 U.S.C. § 41706 (1994).
43 See Smoking Restrictions on International Passenger Flights, Res. A29-15 (1992),
ICAO Doc. 9600-A29/RES, at 74.
44 See Airline Cabin Air Quality Act, H.R. 4495, 103d Cong. (1994).
45 See Abu-Nasr, supra note 35, at 2.
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three people lost their lives.48 People smoke in lavatories de-
spite the presence of fire alarms, and some people try to disable
the smoke alarms even though it is a federal crime to do so.
Others attempt to cover the smoke detectors with a shower cap,
while some unsuccessfully try to blow their smoke down the toi-
let.4" Anyone caught is subject to a $2,000 fine.5 °
B. GAMBLING ON BOARD AIRCRAFr
Gambling on aircraft in the United States is illegal. The Fed-
eral Aviation Administration Authorization Act clearly states that
"[a] n air carrier or foreign air carrier may not install, transport,
or operate, or permit the use of, any gambling device on board
an aircraft in foreign air transportation.'
Some U.S. lawmakers are concerned that airlines may become
"flying casinos" and that a passenger sitting next to a gambler
may not enjoy the flight. Last year, Singapore Airlines reported
its plans to install an in-flight gambling system on its aircraft
from which it expected to earn between $600,000 and $1.5 mil-
lion per year, per aircraft.52 U.S. carriers that are not permitted to
install such systems will lose direct revenues as well as indirect
revenues from passengers who elect to fly to the United States
on a foreign carrier.
Several European and Asian governments protested the U.S.
law that prohibits the installation of gambling systems on for-
eign airlines.53 The U.S. Department of Justice responded by
issuing an opinion that an in-flight entertainment system with
gambling software will not violate U.S. law if it is turned off "dur-
ing any segment of a flight destined for or leaving the U.S. '54
The U.S. law's "extraterritoriality" and the associated public in-
48 See Matthew Wald, Out of the Haze up in the Skies, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1996,
§ 5, at 13. In this case, investigators did not actually prove that the fire was the
direct result of cigarette smoking. See id.
49 See id.
5o See id. The U.S. anti-smoking bias is not shared by all countries. Asians tend
to smoke more than westerners. One indication is the presence of smoking sec-
tions on most flights to Japan. Japan Airlines has even installed special smoking
seats in some of its Boeing 747s. These seats, called kitsuen senyo, are open to any
person who wants to sit and enjoy a cigarette. In contrast, many refurbished
planes in the U.S. do not have ashtrays, even though they do have "no-smoking"
lights, which are required by the FAA. See id. at 13.
51 49 U.S.C. § 41311(a) (1994).
52 See Singapore Airlines Identified as First Sky Games Customer, WORLD AIRLINE
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ternational law issues are beyond the scope of this Article, but it
does raise many questions. For how many hours could a passen-
ger on Singapore airlines gamble with his in-flight entertain-
ment system before it must be turned off: in other words, could
he play for one hour, until entering U.S. air space, or not at all?
Because the Department of Justice Opinion refers to a segment
of a "flight segment destined for or leaving" the United States, it
would seem that there would be no gambling permitted on any
flight between the United States and any other country.55
C. ALCOHOL ABOARD AIRCRAFT
Currently, there is no law, and no sincere proposal to prohibit
drinking alcohol on-board aircraft. The problem with passen-
gers that consume too much alcohol is that they become unruly
and behave badly.56 In many countries and on international
routes, the pilot does have the right to lock those passengers in
the lavatory until the plane lands. 57 However, unscheduled
landings to oust an unruly passenger can cost a carrier
thousands of dollars. The airlines can try to recover this cost
afterwards from the passenger, but such actions can themselves
be expensive and time-consuming.
There are numerous accounts of intoxicated and unruly pas-
sengers. On a United Airlines flight from Frankfurt, Germany,
to Dulles International Airport in Washington, D.C., a passenger
shouted at a flight attendant, contending that the attendant had
bumped him several times with the service cart. 8 The flight at-
tendant doubted bumping the passenger but apologized any-
way. Still dissatisfied, the passenger followed the flight
attendant to the galley, threw him against an emergency exit,
and beat him in the head and face. 59 There are other accounts
55 See id. Laws on this subject may not be needed at all. For example, both
British Airways and Virgin Atlantic permit gambling during flight, but British Air-
ways' gambling limit is $200 and Virgin's limit is $75. These amounts indicate
that the in-flight entertainment is in fact only for "entertainment." The fear of
flying casinos may not be a legitimate concern after all.
56 See Unruly Passenger Behavior Poses Increasing Risk to Safety, AIR SAFETY WK., May
5, 1997, at 8.
57 See Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board
Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, art. 6, 20 U.S.T. 1641, 704 U.N.T.S. 220, 226. On domes-
tic flights, the pilot does not have this right.
58 See Peter Finn, Unfriendly Skies? Attendants Say Assaults, Harassment Up; Coali-
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as well, such as the British and Irish tourists that had a food fight
on the plane, or the Saudi Arabian princess who attacked a
flight attendant for not being served her drink quickly
enough."'
These incidents, however, seem mild compared to an incident
on a United Airlines flight between Buenos Aires and New
York.6 A passenger wanted more wine, but the flight attendants
refused to serve him, because they had stopped the beverage
service at that point, and because he had already poured drinks
on himself and on other passengers. Prosecutors later alleged
that he started drinking before boarding, had continued during
the flight, and then helped himself to the alcohol instead of
waiting to be served. When the flight attendants stopped the
beverage service to begin food service, the passenger threatened
one flight attendant and then pushed another into a seat. The
passenger, an investment banker from Connecticut, climbed on
top of a food cart, lowered his pants, and defecated on top of
the food cart. He then used the linen napkins as toilet paper.
The captain suspended all food and beverage service, due to the
possibility of an infectious condition.
In the subsequent court case, the passenger was fined $48,000
to reimburse the other passengers' ticket costs, and a $5,000
fine.62 He was also ordered to perform 300 hours of community
service and pay United Airlines $1,000 to clean the airplane. 3
Finally, he was also ordered to undergo counseling.64
Today, Congress has not yet addressed the general subject of
excessive in-flight alcohol consumption. However, it is likely
that, as with smoking and gambling, this issue may also be sub-
ject to regulation.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has summarized recent developments in U.S. avia-
tion policy regarding safety and security of flight, ranging from
terrorism to bogus and surplus military aircraft, to smoking,
60 See id.
61 See Gail Appelson, Executive Charged in Airline Attack, Defecation, REUTERS N.
AM. WIRE, Oct. 24, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuna File.
62 See Richard Pyle, AP ONLINE, May 14, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Taponl File.
63 See id.
64 See High-Time Justice, NEWSDAY, May 15, 1996, at A26, available in LEXIS, NY
Library, Newsdy File.
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gambling, and drinking aboard aircraft. All are important issues
that affect the safety and security of flight.
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